Jimmy & Margarets Family

Jimmy & Margarets Family
"Together"

Tuesday, April 21, 2009

Scottish Court of Session

http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2006CSOH194.html

OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION

[2006] CSOH 194


OPINION OF LORD GLENNIE

in the cause

N S A

Pursuer;

against

M A or N

Defender:


­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­________________



Pursuer: Scott; Russel & Aitken
Defender: Absent
15 December 2006

Introduction

[1] The pursuer and the defender were married in Lahore, Pakistan on 20 December 2001. It was an arranged marriage. The formal Rukshati, or sending off the bride, took place on 13 July 2002. Thereafter they moved to live in Scotland. They lived with the pursuer's parents at Bilston, Edinburgh. The pursuer is in regular employment in Scotland as a software engineer. While she was in Edinburgh, the defender attended a University. Their child M was born on 25 May 2004. He is now about 21/2 years old.

[2] In June 2005 the defender, with the consent of the pursuer, took M to see her family in Pakistan. She was due to return home on 18 August 2005. Having twice changed her travel arrangements, the defender did not return to Scotland. She is presently in Pakistan with M. The pursuer has not consented to her keeping M in Pakistan. He has attempted to persuade the defender to return to Scotland to live with him and to bring the child back to Scotland. Those attempts have so far been unsuccessful.

[3] The Summons in this action was signetted on 8 May 2006. In that Summons the pursuer concludes for an order ordaining the defender to return M to Scotland, for a residence order providing that M should reside with him, for an order for delivery of M into his care and control, and for interdict prohibiting the defender from removing M from his care and control or from Scotland. On 8 May 2006 Lady Smith made an interim Order (1) finding and declaring that M was born in Edinburgh and is, prima facie, habitually resident in Scotland and (2) ordaining the defender to return M to Scotland. Despite this, the defender has not returned M to Scotland. Nor has she returned.

[4] That Order and the Summons were both served on the defender in Pakistan on 13 July 2006. I am told that the reason for the delay in service was that the pursuer remained hopeful of persuading the defender to bring M back to Scotland voluntarily; and was concerned lest her knowledge that he had commenced legal proceedings in Scotland should jeopardise the prospects of an amicable resolution of the problem. Be that as it may, this delay in affecting service, though regrettable, does not render that service in any way defective. Service was acknowledged by the defender's lawyers in Pakistan. Furthermore, it is clear from letters which the defender has written to the court, as well as from proceedings which the defender herself has instituted in Pakistan, that the defender is fully aware of the proceedings in Scotland. Nonetheless, she has not entered appearance or lodged defences to the action. The action therefore proceeds formally as an undefended action. However, in any case concerning children, the court will be anxious to take into account the material presented by both parties, even if one of them has not entered the process and, as a result, his or her concerns are presented informally.

Is the defender's retention of the child in Pakistan wrongful?
(i) section 2(3) and (6) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995

[5] In the Summons the pursuer contends that the defender's retention of M in Pakistan is wrongful having regard to the terms of section 2(3) and (6) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. Section 2(3) provides as follows:
"Without prejudice to any Court order, no person shall be entitled to remove a child habitually resident in Scotland from, or to retain any such child outwith, the United Kingdom without the consent of a person described in subsection (6) below".
Subsection (6) provides as follows:
"The description of a person referred to in subsection (3) above is a person (whether or not a parent of the child) who for the time being has and is exercising in relation to him a right mentioned in paragraph (a) or (c) of subsection (1) above; except that, where both the child's parents are persons so described, the consent required for his removal or retention shall be that of them both".
The relevant paragraphs of subsection (1) mention the right to have the child living with him or otherwise to regulate the child's residence and to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the child on a regular basis. It is clear that both parents, i.e. both the pursuer and the defender, have such rights and, until the defender refused to return M from Pakistan, were exercising such rights.

[6] It follows that, subject to the question of whether the child is "habitually resident" in Scotland, the defender is not entitled to retain M outwith the United Kingdom without the consent of the pursuer.

(ii) the meaning of "habitual residence"

[7] The meaning of "habitual residence" was considered by the Inner House in Dickson v Dickson 1990 S.C.L.R. 692. That was a decision as to the meaning of those words in the context of the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, but I see no reason for thinking that a different meaning should be given to those words under the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. The Opinion of the Court was delivered by the Lord President. At page 703, he considered what was meant by the expression "habitual residence". He said this:
"It is enough to say that in our opinion a habitual residence is one which is being enjoyed voluntarily for the time being and with the settled intention that it should continue for some time. ... A person can, we think, have only one habitual residence at any one time and in the case of a child, who can form no intention of his own, it is the residence which is chosen for him by his parents. If they are living together with him, then they will all have their habitual residence in the same place. Where the parents separate, as they did in this case, the child's habitual residence cannot be changed by one parent only unless the other consents to the change".
Applying that guidance, as I must, the position in the present case is as follows. The pursuer was living in Scotland before his marriage. After his marriage, he and the defender both moved to Scotland. The pursuer resumed his employment and the defender enrolled at a university course. It was, at the time of their marriage, their intention to live in Scotland. That this is so is confirmed by item 20 of the parties' Marriage Certificate, which contains a question as to whether any agreement has been reached regarding the guarantee and provision of food, clothing, etc. The answer given was: "This has to be in accordance with the British Law". That, no doubt, was because the parties intended to settle in Britain for some time at least. Given that the pursuer lived in Scotland, I can infer that the answer to question 20 reflected their joint intention to live in Scotland after the marriage. This is what they did. M was born in Edinburgh while the parties were living in Scotland. While they were all living together in Scotland, they all had the same habitual residence, namely, Scotland. The defender could not change M's habitual residence simply by bringing him to or keeping him in Pakistan. As it was put in Dickson v Dickson: "The child's habitual residence cannot be changed by one parent only unless the other consents to the change".

[8] I am therefore satisfied that M was at the time he left Scotland, and still is, habitually resident in Scotland.

[9] It follows, and I so find, that in keeping M in Pakistan without the consent of the pursuer, the defender is acting contrary to section 2(3) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995.

The welfare of the child - s.11 Children (Scotland) Act 1995[10] The fact that the defender is holding M in Pakistan contrary to the provisions of section 2(3) of the Act does not, of course, mean that the pursuer is entitled as of right to the Orders sought in the Summons. The power of the court to make an Order in relation to parental responsibilities, including a residence Order, is contained in section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995. Section 11(7) emphasises that, in considering whether or not to make an Order of that sort, and what Order to make, the Court:
"(a) shall regard the welfare of the child concerned as its paramount consideration and shall not make any such order unless it considers that it would be better for the child that the order be made than that none should be made at all".
This is an obligation imposed on the court which the court takes seriously. Any Order made, indeed any decision whether or not to make an Order, has to be made with a view to the child's welfare.

The UK-Pakistan Judicial Protocol on Children Matters[11] I should, at this stage, refer to the UK-Pakistan Judicial Protocol on Children Matters agreed in January 2003 between the President of the Family Division in England and Wales and the Hon. Chief Justice of Pakistan, each in consultation with members of the Family Judiciary of the UK and of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan respectively. This Protocol has been supplemented by Supplemental Judicial Guidelines on UK-Pakistan Protocol agreed in Islamabad in September 2003, to which Lady Smith has put her name on behalf of the Judges of the Supreme Court of Scotland. Although the Protocol does not have the force of law, nonetheless it represents an attempt by the judiciaries of United Kingdom and Pakistan to co-operate in matters concerning the welfare of children and, in particular, in trying to protect children from the harmful effects of wrongful removal from one country to the other.

[12] Paragraph 1 of the Protocol states that:
"In normal circumstances the welfare of a child is best determined by the courts of the country of the child's habitual/ordinary residence".

[13] Paragraph 5 of the Protocol provides as follows:
"In cases where the habitual/ordinary residence of the child is in dispute the Court to which an application is made should decide the issue of habitual/ordinary residence before making any decision on the return or the general welfare of the child, and upon determination of the preliminary issue as to habitual/ordinary residence should then apply the general principles set out above".

[14] This is an important provision. I have already found that M is habitually resident in Scotland. That finding is consistent with the interim finding by Lady Smith on 8 May 2006.

[15] On that basis, the effect of Paragraph 1 of the Protocol is that in normal circumstances any questions relating to the welfare of M should be determined by the Scottish Courts. Nothing has been brought to my attention suggesting that this case should be viewed as an exception to that rule.

[16] Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Protocol give specific instances of circumstances in which a Judge of the court of a country to which the child has been removed, or from which he should have been but has not been returned, should not ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over the child, save insofar as necessary for the Court to order the return of the child to the country of his habitual or ordinary residence. Both of those instances concern cases where the court of the child's habitual or ordinary residence has made a custody or residence order or a restraint or interdict order. They do not, in terms, therefore, apply to the present circumstances. Nonetheless the general principle in paragraph 1 applies to the present case; and it is, in any event, within the spirit of the Protocol that the Scottish courts, being the courts of the country of M's habitual residence, should determine what is best for his welfare.

[17] I must, therefore, go on to consider the applications before me.
The applications before the court

[18] There are two applications before the court.
(i) The first is an application made by the defender that the court should "stop", or sist, the proceedings in Scotland to await the outcome of proceedings in Pakistan. Although the defender has not entered the process, and although her motion was not formally enrolled with the court, I think it proper that I should deal with it. It is supported by a letter from the defender to the Court of Session dated 20 November 2006. This application came before me on 24 November 2006. The defender was not present at that hearing and I, therefore, continued that hearing until 13 December to give the defender a further opportunity of appearing or being represented. The interlocutor to this effect was served on the defender; and, indeed, in anticipation of the hearing on 13 December, she has sent a further letter to the court.
(ii) The second is an application made by the pursuer by motion heard at the same time as the application by the defender. By his motion the pursuer asks the court to make:
"a residence order limited to arrangements for the child M to reside with the Pursuer from 1pm on Friday to 1pm on Monday each week, or such other periods as the Court shall order or the parties agree, and otherwise to reside with the Defender, on the basis that the Pursuer undertakes that he will make no objection to the Defender lodging a Minute for Variation of said arrangements (if so advised) on her return to the UK".

[19] It is implicit in the pursuer's motion that the Court is being asked also to make final the interim Order made by Lady Smith on 8 May 2006 ordaining the defender to return M to Scotland. Only on this basis, and on the basis that the defender chooses to come back to Scotland, can the proposal of shared residence be made to work.

The defender's motion to sist the proceedings in Scotland

[20] Dealing first with the defender's motion to sist the proceedings in Scotland, I note that soon after the defender was served with the Scottish proceedings on 13 June 2006 she instituted proceedings in Pakistan in the form of a Guardianship Application. I understand this to be an application that she be appointed guardian of the child and, in effect, be awarded sole custody. I have been told that the Guardian Judge at Lahore passed an interim custody order in favour of the defender on 22 June 2006 restraining the present pursuer illegally removing the child from the present defender. Since the Order made by Lady Smith on 8 May 2006 was not complied with, the pursuer has filed an "Article 199 Petition" before the Lahore High Court. This appears to be in the nature of a habeas corpus application on the ground that the child is habitually resident in Scotland and has been illegally and improperly detained in Pakistan, and further that the Scottish Court has made an Order for the return of the child to Scotland. Pending the determination of that petition, the High Court in Pakistan has made an Order that "in the meantime, the minor, namely M shall not be removed from the jurisdiction of this Court".

[21] The Scottish Court has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of the habitual residence of the child, M. Further, in terms of the UK-Pakistan Judicial Protocol, it is agreed between the judicial authorities of both countries that in normal circumstances the welfare of the child is best determined by the courts of the country of the child's habitual residence. That country is Scotland. On the face of it, therefore, it is appropriate and in the interests of the child that this court should be the court which determines the matters in issue in this case. Furthermore, it is clear that no proceedings were commenced in Pakistan until after the Scottish proceedings were served on the defender. In those circumstances, it would be wrong to sist the proceedings in Scotland to await the outcome of those currently underway in Pakistan.

[22] I reach this decision to refuse to sist the Scottish proceedings without any disrespect to the courts in Pakistan before whom cases are presently pending. But those courts have only made interim orders; and I do not consider that any Order that I make runs counter to the existence of those interim orders. I recognise, however, that before M can be brought back to the UK pursuant to this Order, it will clearly be necessary that the pursuer's representatives make appropriate representations to the courts and other authorities in Pakistan, directly and/or through the liaison judge appointed in terms of the UK-Pakistan Judicial Protocol. I am confident that the Protocol will be an effective tool in helping to resolve the present difficulties.

[23] I should mention two matters which have come to my attention in the course of dealing with this matter.
(1) The first is that by letter dated 12 December 2006 faxed to the Court of Session, the defender has told the court that the pursuer's Article 199 Petition in the Lahore High Court has been dismissed. She goes on to say that the High Court ordered that the parties are free to contest the guardianship of the child in the action pending before the Guardian Judge in Lahore. Counsel for the pursuer told me that her agents had contacted their lawyer in Pakistan, and that she had told them that her enquiries did not reveal that the Petition had been dismissed. I cannot decide that. However, it seems to me that that question can make no difference to the decision I have made to refuse the sist.
(2) The second point is this. I have been shown various pleadings and other documents in the proceedings before the Guardian Judge in Pakistan. In her "Written Reply of Application for Issuance of Guardianship Certificate...", the present defender has told the Guardian Judge that she had been telephoned by a representative of the Court of Session in Scotland and told that "the proceedings being conducted [in Scotland] have been completely stopped until this Learned Family Court of Pakistan decides the matter". In paragraph 5(a) of that same document, the present defender says: "The Scotland Court of Sessions has accepted the stance of the Petitioner and hence stopped the proceedings [i.e. in Scotland]". I do not know whether the defender has misunderstood something that was said to her. However, I can state categorically that the proceedings in Scotland have not been stopped at any time. Indeed, the defender has been aware that the proceedings in Scotland were continuing, since she has written to the court in Scotland in relation to the various applications made or to be made in court in these proceedings. I would not wish the Court in Pakistan to proceed on a wrong understanding of the procedural status of the Scottish proceedings.

The pursuer's motion

[24] In his motion, the pursuer seeks a final determination of these proceedings, not to the full extent claimed in the Summons but in a modified form providing for shared residence.

[25] In support of the averments in the Summons, I have had presented to me an affidavit from the pursuer as well as affidavits from his mother, SB, and from a MW who works at a residential care home in Bilston and helps in the house where the pursuer lives with his family. On the basis of those affidavits I am satisfied that the welfare of M would be best served if I were to make the Order sought by the pursuer and I shall accordingly do so. Given the possibility that the defender will wish to apply to the court to vary or recall the Order, it is better that I say no more on this matter. The Order assumes that the defender will also return to Scotland. Unless she does so, then the part of the Order providing that M reside with her for half of each week cannot take effect.

[26] I should emphasise, if it were not already sufficiently clear, that since the defender has not entered the process I have not heard her side of the story except for the general comments made in correspondence and in the court proceedings in Pakistan. This is no doubt because the defender wishes to contest jurisdiction. I should, however, make it clear that if in the light of my decision the defender wishes to apply to the court for a variation or recall of the order I have made, she is perfectly at liberty to do so and the court will consider the matter afresh and make a decision having regard to the welfare of the child as a paramount consideration. There is express provision for this in the 1995 Act and in the Rules of Court: see Rule of Court 49.63. The defender will not be prejudiced in any such application by the fact that she has not taken part in the proceedings to date. The undertaking referred to in the pursuer's motion is an express recognition by the pursuer of the fact that, whatever Order the court makes in disposing of proceedings concerning children under section 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, that Order may be varied at any time on the application of either party. In offering his undertaking, the pursuer has made it clear through counsel that, if the defender applies to the court in Scotland to vary the Order, the pursuer will not advance any argument to the effect that a change of circumstances is required before the Order can be varied or recalled.

Monday, April 20, 2009

Badly flawed the child protection and children in care system

This link is to the whole report

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmchilsch/111/11102.htm Summary
For those children who come into care, it will always be a distant second best to growing up happily and safely in their own family. Time in care is generally seen by professionals and the wider public as something to be avoided at all costs. Despite the dedication and perseverance of social workers and carers, the outcomes and experiences of young people who have been 'looked after' remain poor. Far from compensating for their often extremely difficult pre-care experiences, certain features of the care system itself in fact make it harder for young people to succeed: they are moved frequently and often suddenly, miss too much schooling, and are left to fend for themselves at too early an age.

The Government has acknowledged many of these problems and has sought to be comprehensive in its response. The Care Matters White Paper and the legislation that followed it (the Children and Young Persons Act 2008) have on the whole received a positive reception from children's services authorities, voluntary sector organisations and children themselves. We welcome the priority the Government has put on improving outcomes for looked-after children, and we do not doubt its commitment to achieving this. However, success will not flow automatically from new legislation or guidance. Previous programmes of substantial reform and investment have left outcomes for looked-after children still lagging unacceptably far behind those for other children. Inconsistency in practice and underperformance against current standards show that there are significant underlying challenges to implementation of the new raft of measures, challenges which we fear the Government has not done enough to address. We also believe that Care Matters represents a missed opportunity for certain sections of the care population. It is not clear that unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, and looked-after children who enter custody, will benefit equally from the new initiatives and the principles informing them.

Relationships

Stable, reliable bonds with key individuals are fundamental to children's security and development. In all circumstances, the care system should be supportive of rather than obstructive of good relationships. Children too rarely have the sort of relationship with their social worker that they want. High staff turnover, heavy workloads and an administrative burden all militate against relationships flourishing. Vacancy rates remain high and new recruits lack support. Social workers feel disempowered and when more experienced may seek moves away from frontline work. The same factors impinge on social workers' capacity to forge constructive relationships with families before problems escalate to the point where a care order might be sought.

Continuity in relationships with foster carers depends on preventing placement breakdowns and building long-term placements into care plans; the prospect of a placement breakdown should be treated with as much concern as the prospect of a child being removed from their birth family in the first place. The quality of support foster carers receive in terms of planned respite, input from other agencies, and access to advice at times of crisis is crucial to this. We believe that there is no justification for the vast inequities of payment and conditions in the foster care sector at present. Carers—including kinship carers—must be able to have a fair and transparent expectation of the support they will receive, wherever in the country and for whomever they foster. Stronger leadership at national government level, and a greater willingness to specify the support that carers and their families should be entitled to, would strengthen the efforts of local agencies to recruit foster carers.
Placements

These recruitment efforts are vital to increasing the supply of placements, which affects children's prospects for choice, individualisation and stability. Placements are already in short supply, their quality is not consistent, and parts of the Care Matters reform programme, such as post-18 fostering, will put even greater pressure on their availability. The Government has placed a new duty on local authorities to ensure a sufficient supply of placements locally, but has not paid enough attention to strengthening local authorities' hands in achieving it.

There should be no "cheap options" in the care system. From time to time in the evidence we took there surfaced a suspicion that decisions taken by local authorities are motivated in some circumstances by costs, and that children do not get all they are entitled to because of pressure on councils' resources. We do not share this suspicion of local authorities' motives, but we are concerned that it can exist. Any option for highly vulnerable children with complex needs—whether family support, long term foster care, kinship care, or supported independence—will only be successful with intensive support and substantial resourcing.

The performance framework

Improvement in the care system must be underpinned by a performance framework that emphasises the most important things: quality of decision-making, of relationships, and of children's experiences of care. We believe that quality assessment and children's satisfaction are undervalued by the current performance regime. Processes and outcomes are both important, but if what we are primarily concerned about is how happy children are in care, then the Government must be prepared to be innovative in finding new ways to assess quality of care. Pilots of new initiatives such as social pedagogy or independent social work practices promise innovative ways of tackling some of the deficiencies in the care system, but it will ultimately be much more important to ensure that the basics of the system are implemented consistently and enforced rigorously. We seek reassurance that the inspection regime will be a sufficient and effective tool to achieve this. It is not clear what sanctions are available against authorities which fail in their duty as parents, nor what incentives are in place to encourage them to fulfil this duty.
The workforce

Three themes run through our conclusions. The first is the importance of the workforce; implementation of well-intentioned initiatives and guidance depends ultimately on the skills and capacity of staff and carers who deal with children day to day. An effective care system can only be achieved by recruiting enough of the right people, giving them access to the right training, paying them enough, backing them up with practical support, and placing them in structures that allow them to build relationships with children and influence things on the child's behalf. While the Government is seeking to address aspects of this through, for example, the Social Work Taskforce and Social Work Practices pilots, other aspects, such as delegation to foster carers, have been relatively neglected. Residential care in particular requires much greater focus on the level and type of staff qualifications so that the full potential of that type of care might be realised.

Corporate parenting

The second theme is how local authorities can come to approximate more closely the care of birth parents. Many of the things we wish would happen in the care system would follow naturally if the system and those who work within it were minded, and enabled, to act more like parents. Bureaucracy, misdirected aversion to risk, lack of autonomy and restricted resources limit the capacity of corporate parents to normalise children's experience of growing up in care. The Government's willingness to act as a "pushy parent" in ensuring that looked-after children have priority access to schools is welcome, but should not be restricted to the sphere of education; health services and housing are just as important, as are adult services when the young person is moving towards independence. A local authority that was truly acting like a parent would not contemplate allowing a vulnerable young person to strike out unsupported on their own even at age 18, much less if they were going to live, as many do, in substandard accommodation. Where the corporate parent bears some responsibility for things going wrong—such as when children in care become involved in criminal activity—it must be held to account and involved in putting things right every bit as much as the state expects of other parents. Good parenting entails making decisions that are based on the particular needs of each child, and so performance frameworks should be adjusted to focus on the quality and promptness of decision-making about individual children: making the right decision at the right time.

The voice of the child

Thirdly, there is the importance of the voice of the child. Only by setting more store by children's satisfaction with their care will we get closer to finding out how "cared about" they really feel, how stable and secure their lives seem, and whether they have both opportunities and the support and encouragement needed to take them. Initiatives that seek to give children—collectively and individually—more say about their care must be specific, robust and enforceable. The variation currently apparent in services leads us to believe that more independent support is needed for children to express their views and have them listened to.

The purpose of the care system

Large variations in care populations around the country seem to indicate that there is no consensus about the role of care in services for vulnerable children. We are convinced that in some respects the potential of the care system to make a positive difference to children's lives is dismissed too readily, but we are also concerned by how widely the quality of children's experiences in care varies, and how uneven are the experiences families have of support services prior to care. Children's services must have the tools to spot trouble in families at an early stage, and must be able to have confidence that the interventions at their disposal are of a high quality and will make a positive difference to families. We would like to envisage a care system that is seen not as a sanction against failing parents, nor as a catastrophe for children's future prospects, but as a way of supporting families that are under stress and not functioning well.

This shift in perception is only desirable if care is an integral part of a continuum of effective family support services, not an alternative to it. It is only justifiable if we are able to reassure parents that their child, when in care, will have stability and personalised attention rather than a life ruled by uncertainty and bureaucracy, will have access to all the health and therapeutic care that they need to enjoy life and develop into independent adults, will be protected from rather than exposed to risk of offending, and will not feel abandoned by children's services when they reach 16, or 18, or if they go into custody. There are some children in care who have all of this, and many more who have some of it, thanks to dedicated, compassionate carers and diligent local authorities. The question the Government must do more to answer is, how can we make sure that all looked-after children get all that they are entitled to expect from their time in care?

Friday, April 17, 2009

Family courts to be opened to press from 27 April 2009

http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed34385

Jack Straw announces long-awaited regulations opening up family courts to media access
Jack Straw, The Secretary of State for Justice, has announced that the long-awaited regulations concerning the opening up of the family courts to the press will come into effect on 27 April.
Under the rules, media representatives who hold a UK Press Card will be able to attend all levels of court, including matters heard "in private" subject to the court’s ability to restrict access as follows:

At any stage of the proceedings the court may direct that persons within paragraph (3)(f) shall not attend the proceedings or any part of them, where satisfied that—

(a) this is necessary—
(i) in the interests of any child concerned in, or connected with, the proceedings;(ii) for the safety or protection of a party, a witness in the proceedings, or a person connected with such a party or witness; or(iii) for the orderly conduct of the proceedings; or
(b) justice will otherwise be impeded or prejudiced.

UK Press Cards are available on application to any one working "professionally as a media worker who needs to identify himself or herself in public." The scheme was introduced by the Metropolitan Police in 1992 and is recognised by police force and other public bodies.
Announcing the changes, the Minister reiterated his views in why the reform was necessary
"Public confidence in the justice system is a necessary and vital part of a democratic society. I want to ensure that reforms to the family courts system increase their accountability to the public"

The changes are introduced by the following statutory instruments:
Family Proceedings Courts (Miscellaneous Amendments) Rules 2009
Family Proceedings (Amendment) (No.2) Rules 2009

The corrupt business of child protective services

From the legislative desk of Senator Nancy Schaefer 50th District of Georgia
November 16, 2007

THE CORRUPT BUSINESS OF CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICESBY: Nancy Schaefer

Senator, 50th DistrictMy introduction into child protective service cases was due to a grandmother in an adjoining state who called me with her tragic story. Her two granddaughters had been taken from her daughter who lived in my district. Her daughter was told wrongly that if she wanted to see her children again she should sign a paper and give up her children.

Frightened and young, the daughter did. I have since discovered that parents are often threatened into cooperation of permanent separation of their children.The children were taken to another county and placed in foster care. The foster parents were told wrongly that they could adopt the children. The grandmother then jumped through every hoop known to man in order to get her granddaughters. When the case finally came to court it was made evident by one of the foster parent’s children that the foster parents had, at any given time, 18 foster children and that the foster mother had an inappropriate relationship with the caseworker.In the courtroom, the juvenile judge, acted as though she was shocked and said the two girls would be removed quickly. They were not removed.

Finally, after much pressure being applied to the Department of Family and Children Services of Georgia (DFCS), the children were driven to South Georgia to meet their grandmother who gladly drove to meet them.After being with their grandmother two or three days, the judge, quite out of the blue, wrote up a new order to send the girls to their father, who previously had no interest in the case and who lived on the West Coast.

The father was in “adult entertainment”. His girlfriend worked as an “escort” and his brother, who also worked in the business, had a sexual charge brought against him.Within a couple of days the father was knocking on the grandmother’s door and took the girls kicking and screaming to California. The father developed an unusual relationship with the former foster parents and soon moved back to the southeast, and the foster parents began driving to the father’s residence and picking up the little girls for visits. The oldest child had told her mother and grandmother on two different occasions that the foster father molested her.To this day after five years, this loving, caring blood relative grandmother does not even have visitation privileges with the children.

The little girls are in my opinion permanently traumatized and the young mother of the girls was so traumatized with shock when the girls were first removed from her that she has not recovered.Throughout this case and through the process of dealing with multiple other mismanaged cases of the Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS), I have worked with other desperate parents and children across the state because they have no rights and no one with whom to turn. I have witnessed ruthless behavior from many caseworkers, social workers, investigators, lawyers, judges, therapists, and others such as those who “pick up” the children. I have been stunned by what I have seen and heard from victims all over the state of Georgia.In this report, I am focusing on the Georgia Department of Family and Children Services (DFCS). However, I believe Child Protective Services nationwide has become corrupt and that the entire system is broken almost beyond repair. I am convinced parents and families should be warned of the dangers.The Department of Child Protective Services, known as the Department of Family and Children Service (DFCS) in Georgia and other titles in other states, has become a “protected empire” built on taking children and separating families. This is not to say that there are not those children who do need to be removed from wretched situations and need protection.

This report is concerned with the children and parents caught up in “legal kidnapping,” ineffective policies, and DFCS who do does not remove a child or children when a child is enduring torment and abuse. (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B) In one county in my District, I arranged a meeting for thirty-seven families to speak freely and without fear. These poor parents and grandparents spoke of their painful, heart wrenching encounters with DFCS. Their suffering was overwhelming. They wept and cried. Some did not know where their children were and had not seen them in years. I had witnessed the “Gestapo” at work and I witnessed the deceitful conditions under which children were taken in the middle of the night, out of hospitals, off of school buses, and out of homes. In one county a private drug testing business was operating within the DFCS department that required many, many drug tests from parents and individuals for profit. In another county children were not removed when they were enduring the worst possible abuse.

Due to being exposed, several employees in a particular DFCS office were fired. However, they have now been rehired either in neighboring counties or in the same county again. According to the calls I am now receiving, the conditions in that county are returning to the same practices that they had before the light was shown on their deeds.Having worked with probably 300 cases statewide, I am convinced there is no responsibility and no accountability in the system.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5Yt-OzyD3g <-- click this to watch senator schaefers video.

Thursday, April 9, 2009

False Allegations- epetition response. From UK Gov

Thursday 9 April 2009

FalseAllegation - epetition response

We received a petition asking:

“We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to introduce a new offence of ‘Making a False Allegation’, punishable by a MINIMUM (not maximum) sentence of one year in prison and a recommendation that any sentence passed down should more closely match what the falsely accused person may have faced had they been wrongly found guilty.”
Details of Petition:

“If (for example) A makes a false allegation of rape against B, B can be sentenced to up to 8 years in prison if found guilty, but if A is found guilty of making that false allegation, they will generally receive less than a year and even this is often suspended so they don’t actually end up in prison. Technically the false accuser can be found guilty of Perverting the Course of Justice (maximum sentence of LIFE) but judges simply don’t hand down very large sentences for false accusers despite being allowed to. Having a MINIMUM sentence of a year with a recommendation that any sentence passed down should more closely match what the falsely accused person may have faced had they been wrongly found guilty should deter more people from making false allegations and properly punish those who flout the law. Murder already carries a MINIMUM sentence of LIFE so minimum sentences are clearly allowed in law.”

· Read the petition· Petitions homepage

Read the Government’s response

Thank you for your e-petition asking for the creation of a new offence of “making a false allegation”, punishable with a minimum sentence of one year in prison and a sentence more closely matching what the falsely accused person may have received had they been found guilty.
It is a serious matter for anyone to make a false allegation that a criminal offence has been committed, and there are a range of offences to deal with those who might seek to pursue such allegations, including the offences of perverting the course of justice, wasting police time and perjury. The latter carries a maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment, and the courts have consistently held that a custodial sentence is appropriate for deliberate perjury in the face of the court. The decision to investigate a possible offence against the administration of justice is a matter for the police. Within these parameters, sentencing decisions in individual cases are a matter for the courts, who will make their decision based on the facts of the offence and the offender, taking into account any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

There are also other important safeguards in the criminal justice system against the conviction of the innocent, including the presumption of innocence, the high standard of proof whereby it is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the right to legal representation, and the right to call any witnesses to challenge and test evidence through cross-examination. In order to ensure that anyone who is wrongly convicted can have this injustice righted, there is also the right to seek leave to appeal against conviction or sentence.

We are not planning to make the suggested legislative changes. The police have a responsibility to make detailed investigations where allegations are made of serious offences. If their investigation results in what the police regard as sufficient evidence, they will refer the case to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for a decision as to whether the case meets the evidential and public interest tests for prosecution. Before the police decide to refer a case and when the CPS considers it, both authorities have to consider the nature of the evidence before them, and they will take account of any indications that false allegations may have been made against the individual accused of the crime.

There are a limited number of serious offences that attract minimum sentences, including murder; but offences relating to the making of false accusations are not included.

Grandparents in children's lives.

Best leave kids with grandparents'
http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1237937

Grandparents are positive force for distressed kids
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/09/content_10977350.htm

Grandparents found be a stabilizing source for kids, especially those in turmoil
http://www.examiner.com/x-5092-Denver-Family-Health-Examiner~y2009m3d7-Grandparents-found-be-a-stabilizing-source-for-kids-especially-those-in-turmoil

The season for grandparents.
http://gerwick.blogspot.com/2009/03/tis-season-for-grandparents.html

Grandparents mentor UA students
http://media.wildcat.arizona.edu/media/storage/paper997/news/2009/03/09/News/Grandparents.Mentor.Ua.Students-3665248.shtml

This is a cracker.

Scottish minister denounces 'chuck-it-away' society and urges darning of socks
http://grumpyspindoctor.blogspot.com/2009/03/why-roseanna-cunnigham-never-became-snp.html

Wednesday, April 8, 2009

Free Paringting Apart Workshops

These are ‘one-off’ workshops. They offer a mixture of information and exercises and give plenty of opportunities for participants to learn from each other and share experience.

Topics covered include: the impact of separation on children, including issues that may arise for them when parents live apart; what to say to children about the break up and about the other parent; how best to support children; and how best to manage communication with the other parent.

People seem to get a lot from the workshops and particularly appreciate the opportunity to talk with others in the same – or opposite! – situation.

Oxfordshire Family Mediation
125 London Road
Headington
Oxford
OX3 9HZ

Tel: 01865 741781
Fax: 01865 744393
Website: http://www.ofm.org.uk/

The Great things about grandparents.

The Irish Times

Tuesday, April 7, 2009
The great things about grandparents

PADRAIG O'MORAIN

Grandparents are a great source of stability, friendship and guidance for their grandchildren

WHEN WE think of grandparents’ involvement with their children, we often think of the experience as primarily being one that meets the grandparents’ needs. The doting grandparent seems to get more out of the transaction than the child. But there is now a whole body of information, including some very interesting new research from the UK, suggesting that the main beneficiaries are the children themselves.

This is especially so, it seems, where the parent with whom the children are living is a lone parent or where they live in stepfamilies.
A stepfamily is one in which only one of the parents is the biological parent. The UK research was in relation to adolescents.

In fact, the research suggests that schools, courts, social workers and other institutions should be very anxious indeed to promote the role of grandparents in relation to children.
Not only do grandparents provide friendship and guidance for their grandchildren but they can also be a continuous presence in the life of the child and thereby provide stability as parents are splitting up or changing partners.

Grandparents also operate as an influence on the behaviour of the parents, encouraging them to act in ways that are good for the children.
With people living longer and with the traditional family in decline (at least for now), grandparents are becoming more and more important in the lives of their grandchildren.

I suppose we might all assume that the children who benefit most from the involvement of grandparents are those who are living in lone-parent families. Not so. To my surprise, it is the children living in stepfamilies who are most likely to benefit from the ongoing involvement of grandparents, according to the research.

This has obvious implications for a society like ours in which the break up of marriages and the formation of new families is increasingly common.
It suggests that in stepfamilies the children are at greater risk of maladjustment or of having emotional difficulties than in lone-parent families. The antidote, if you like, is to ensure that the children’s biological grandparents remain involved with them.

From time to time we hear of the pain of grandparents excluded from involvement in the lives of their grandchildren following a marriage break-up.
What the research suggests is that such a situation is not just painful and unfair – it’s also plain stupid.

It removes from the grandchildren a support which could stand to them for the rest of their lives and without which they could suffer. As a general rule – perhaps too general – girls tend to have emotional difficulties where boys tend to have conduct difficulties. Of course, children in all sorts of families can have such difficulties. Therefore, in all sorts of families, involvement by grandparents should be encouraged but this is especially so in relation to children in stepfamilies and lone-parent families.

UK research also suggests that it is in the grandparents whom children confide most in the emotionally painful weeks after their parents separate.
Generally speaking, the grandchildren in such cases are more likely to be closer to their maternal than to their paternal grandparents. This presumably is because custody of the children almost always goes to the mother.

Closeness to paternal grandparents seems to be especially helpful to girls, less so to boys. And closeness to grandparents also tends to lessen the likelihood of depression. Grandparents care for their grandchildren, they play with them, they advise them and they befriend them. No wonder, therefore, that a relationship with grandparents is of such great importance to children.
Grandparents also occupy a unique role in relation to the child’s parents.

In the child’s eyes, the grandparent is more powerful than the parent because the grandparent is the parent’s parent.

At the same time, the grandparent may be inclined to indulge the child more than his or her own father or mother might do. Therefore, the child will see the grandparent as very much on his or her own side and, at the same time, see this person as an authority figure to be treated with respect.

The British study involving 1,500 secondary school children from England and Wales is published in the Journal of Family Psychology.

Padraig O’Morain is a counsellor. His book, That’s Men the best of the That’s Men column from The Irish Times , is published by Veritas
This article appears in the print edition of the Irish Times